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ESCOBEDO-TOWARD ELIMINATING

COERCED CONFESSIONS
STANLEY MILLEDGE*

Escobedo v. Illinois' may well prove much more significant than
Gideon v. Wainwright,2 although the latter had to come first. In Gideon
a unanimous Court specifically abandoned the due process "special circumstances" approach to dealing with the denial of the right to counsel
in favor of the direct approach of making the Sixth Amendment obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. As Justice Harlan
observed in a separate concurring opinion, the Supreme Court had already
held in a series of cases since Betts v. Brady,3 that due process is denied
whenever counsel is denied when the criminal charge is serious. The
"vague contours," to use Justice Frankfurter's words, or the "fluid doctrine" to use Justice Robert Roberts' words, of due process had already
become fairly definite in contour and solid in content whenever the right
to counsel is involved. If this gradual acquisition of definiteness of Supreme Court decisions had been generally noticed and followed in state
court practice, perhaps there would have been no occasion for a Gideon
decision. In fact, Gideon would have had a lawyer at his trial, or failing
that, his case would have been reversed in the Supreme Court of Florida.
That case does not seem to have had unusual state court treatment, for
the usual state court application of the Betts rule was that only in capital
cases was the denial of counsel to an indigent a denial of due process.
The cases cited by Justice Harlan in his Note Five to his concurring opinion in Gideon4 to illustrate his point that the Supreme Court's post-Betts
cases were not being followed in the state courts, are obvious denials of
due process as applied in the Supreme Court cases between Betts and
Gideon. Justice Harlan's point, and it seems an excellent one, is that although the due process cases had in fact become definite as to the right
to counsel, state courts were not generally apprehending this. The matter,
therefore, should be restated in terms of the Sixth Amendment rather
than in due process terms. This reaches the same result as saying that in
every felony case the denial of counsel is a denial of due process. Long
before the Supreme Court came around to the view that counsel is indispensable to a fair trial, virtually everyone else had. Few, if any, defendants who had a choice, chose to eschew the assistance of counsel.
* Circuit Judge (retired) Eleventh Judicial District of Florida; Professor of Law,
Stetson University.
1. 378 U.S. 478 (1963).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4. 372 U.S. at 350, 351, note 5. One of the cases cited in this Note is Commonwealth,
ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 405 Pa. 562, 176 A.2d 94 (1961), in which both trial and
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a moron with an intelligence quotient of 59, intelligently waived the right to counsel by failing to ask, and that his trial without counsel
was not a denial of due process.
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Why did not state court practice in according counsel observe and
follow the evolution of the Betts doctrine? There are three plausible explanations. One, and perhaps the main one, is that it is difficult to evaluate
the significance of due process cases unless they can be considered in terms
of particular and definite facts. Due process is a nebulous concept. Its
existence or non-existence requires consideration of all of the circumstances. It often is a matter of time and place. The factors considered
are frequently psychological. The evaluation of all factors is necessarily
colored with a high degree of subjectivity. It is inevitable that an ad hoc
decision which must speak in terms of "fairness" or whether conduct is
"shocking" is a hard one to follow faithfully.
The process of determining the question was described by Justice
Frankfurter in Culombe v. Connecticut:'
The inquiry whether, in a particular case, a confession was
voluntarily or unvoluntarily made involves, at the least, a threephased process. First, there is the business of finding the crude
historical facts, the external "phenomenologocical" occurrences
and events surrounding the confession. Second, because the
concept of "voluntariness" is one which concerns a mental state,
there is the imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of internal "psychological" fact. Third, there is the application of this
psychological fact of standards for judgment informed by the
larger legal conceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of law
but which, also comprehend both induction from, and anticipation of, factual circumstances.
That trial judges who are not introverts do not follow due process
cases assiduously should be understandable. Quite often due process
cases can be thought of in terms of the presence of certain specific facts.
Pennoyer v. Neff' is an example. That decision was not inevitable. The
Court might well have adopted the dissent of Justice Hunt. It chose the
views of Justice Fields and held that a personal judgment entered on
constructive service pursuant to Oregon statute was a denial of due
process even though the non-resident defendant owned land in Oregon
but not attached. In practice Pennoyer is followed quite generally but it
should be noticed that the principle of the case need not be known to say
that although a valid decree may be entered in a mortgage foreclosure
on constructive service, a judgment for the deficiency may not be entered. A valid decree of divorce may rest on constructive service but not
an award for alimony. It is not necessary that the judge who so holds actually understands Pennoyer. The problems can be considered and dealt
with on fact combinations. As to whether it is as easy to follow the principle
of Pennoyer as it is certain familiar rule of thumb applications see
5. 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1960).
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Burkhart v. Circuit Court.7 The technique of trial judging utilizes the ear
more than the eye. In common with the rest of mankind, judges generally
abhor the generalized principle and yearn for the specific rule. Generalization permits the growth of legal ideas but the usual trial preference is
for stability and definiteness. From the impossible job of deciding how
much alimony to award, for which there is no standard, one turns with
relief to deciding whether a statute of limitations has run.
A second possible explanation of why cases on the nebulous standard
of due process are not assiduously followed is that, since they involve
such subjective ideas as "fairness," state court judges are apt to be more
concerned with their own conception of this than they are with that of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Such cases seem to be more the
voices of judges than the voice of the Constitution. The state court judge
who tried Gideon certainly didn't think that he was fundamentally unfair.
A third explanation for the small heed trial judges paid to recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the right to counsel as a matter of special
circumstances is the force of habit. Accommodation had been made to appoint counsel in capital cases for indigent defendants, paid at public expense. There was, generally, no legal machinery for affording counsel to
indigent defendants in non-capital cases at public expense. It was not
customary to appoint counsel in such cases to serve without pay. Trying
indigent non-capital criminal defendants without counsel seemed to satisfy
most communities. The familiar courtroom procedural safeguards were
generally applied such as prohibiting the prosecutor to comment on the
failure of the lawyer-less defendant to testify. Judges, like most others,
are apt to be creatures of habit. If a procedure is customary it must be
right. The present writer recalls, with chagrin, his own slowness, as a trial
judge to realize that the purpose of a jury charge is to enable them to apply
the rules of law and therefore the judge should eschew the technical expressions of appellate court opinions and speak the common language.
Whether the foregoing explanations are good or bad, the fact is obvious
that the Supreme Court cases between Betts and Gideon had little impact
on the problem of affording counsel to indigent defendants in non-capital
cases.

On the contrary, Gideon, holding that the Sixth Amendment is obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, spoke in direct and
simple terms. The Constitution says that Gideon is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Gideon had no counsel because he could not hire one.
He did not have a fair trial because no felony defendant can have a fair
trial without the assistance of counsel, so Gideon applies to every felony
defendant, solvent or insolvent. If states wish to convict defendants in
felony cases, they must make provision for counsel when the defendant
is indigent. Nothing could be more simple. The decision is easy to under7. 146 Fla. 457, 1 So.2d 872 (1941).
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stand. There is nothing of the involved process which Justice Frankfurter
described' in determining whether the voluntariness of a confession is a
denial of due process or in a like manner determining whether the denial
of counsel is a denial of due process as it is described by Justice Roberts
in Betts. A definite clear-cut standard is operable. One does not know
whether state reception of Gideon was, on the whole, cordial or hostile.
One does know that it had an immediate impact. Provision was made for
public defenders or provision was made for court-appointed counsel. The
same sort of impact was previously noticed by the cases holding that a
Negro has been denied equal protection when Negroes are intentionally
and systematically excluded from grand and petit juries. In Dade County,
Florida, all that was necessary was for the judges to tell the jury commissions to stop the practice.
The same point will hereafter be attempted-to show that the due
process decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the admissibility
of confessions had limited impact but that Escobedo based on the definite
standard of the right to counsel will have great impact on the admissibility
of confessions.
This definite standard was applied in Escobedo. Escobedo was
arrested and taken to a police station. He was not taken promptly before a
committing magistrate as Illinois law requires, where he would have been
told of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and his right
to counsel. The police did not provide a substitute for this by advising the
accused of his rights. They proceeded to subject him to a secret interrogation notwithstanding his demand to see his lawyer; and his lawyer's demanding, at the police station, to see his client. By means not now
relevant, the police induced a confession. The trial court admitted the
confession and Escobedo was convicted of murdering his brother-in-law.
The Illinois Supreme Court first reversed but later affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed but not on the due process ground of the admission of a coerced confession. The decision is
based on the inadmissibility of the confession because it was obtained
during the exclusion of counsel. That the Sixth Amendment is obligatory
upon the States had already been decided in Gideon, but that case dealt
with the right to counsel at trial. The significant aspect of Escobedo is that
for the first time the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was held to begin
when the proceedings become adversary in fact and not merely in theory.
The Court was careful to say that its decision did not affect the police
right and duty to investigate unsolved crime and to conduct interrogations to this end.
There is no implication in Escobedo that police are restricted in interrogation as part of a general investigation of an unsolved crime. The restriction begins when police determination of guilt has been made; and the
8. See note 5 supra.
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process of convicting the accused begins by the technique of self-incrimination. The observation of Justice White, in dissent, that the Escobedo
decision cuts off all opportunity for police interrogation misses the point.
At the investigative phase there is no right to counsel, for the adversary
proceedings have not started.
Escobedo marked the beginning of the adversary proceeding as the
time when a particular person, the accused, is arrested, confined and
self-incrimination is sought as a means of obtaining a conviction. The
Court cited the observation of Justice Black that the "right to use counsel
at the formal trial is a very hollow thing [if] for all practical purposes, the
conviction is already assured by pre-trial examination." 9
Gideon recognized the right to counsel quantitatively. It extends to
all felony defendants regardless of means. Escobedo recognized the right
qualitatively; that is, not merely when the proceedings become adversary in form but when they become adversary in fact. It seems to be selfevident that the right to have counsel from the beginning will have a
greater affect on police practices than having counsel in every felony
at the trial only. At a conference of high law enforcement officials, 10
at which court decisions were viewed with alarm, Gideon was not mentioned but Escobedo was, although it was then only pending. There
were no dissents in Gideon; there were four dissenters in Escobedo
and all dissenting opinions stressed the adverse effect on law enforcement. The effect, of course, is upon the process of obtaining confessions. If one assumes that the technique of obtaining confessions by
secret police interrogations is one of coercion then it follows that the presence of counsel at such proceedings either eliminates or greatly reduces
the number of coerced confessions. If, on the other hand, one assumes that
the coerced confession is the exception rather than the rule, then the presence of counsel can have no appreciable effect upon the number of confessions. The extent to which confessions depend on the ignorance of the accused was stated (with a lack of unctiousness rare in a former prosecutor)
by Justice Jackson in Watts v. Indiana:
To subject one without counsel to questioning which may and
is intended to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom.
To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the crime,
because under our adversary system, he deems that his sole duty
is to protect his client-guilty or innocent-and that in such
capacity he owes no duty whatever to help society solve its crime
problem. Under this conception of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the -suspect in no uncertain terms to
make no statement under any circumstances.
9. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1956)
10. See note 33 infra.
11. 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1948).

(Black, J. dissenting).
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Counsel at the interrogation can advise his client of his privilege and
urge its exercise. He has no other power. He cannot stop the police. If
their means are perfectly legitimate, the prosecution has nothing to fear
when the "free and voluntary" confession is offered at the trial. The statement of Justice White' 2 is hard to understand:
The right to counsel now not only entitles the accused to counsel's advice and aid in preparing for trial but stands as an impenetrable barrier to any interrogation once the accused has become
a suspect.
If the presence of counsel who can do nothing but advise and observe
is an impenetrable barrier, to what is he being a barrier? Surely he is no
barrier to the man who, without coercion of any sort, is willing freely and
voluntarily to confess. Unless there is coercion, when a man, knowing
that he cannot be so compelled, voluntarily places the noose around his
own neck, his interest in self-preservation must have been overcome by
some stronger motive, such as a feeling of guilt and desire for expatiation.
In those situations it matters not who is present. Such a man would confess to the magistrate or to the judge in open court. The presence of counsel would not matter. Since judges generally agree in saying that only the
free and voluntary confession meets the test of due process, a valid objection to counsel's presence should show how his mere presence constitutes
this impenetrable barrier to such confessions. None of the dissenting
opinions in Escobedo contain such an analysis. It is suggested here that
there is none. This writer agrees that counsel at the police interrogation
is a formidable barrier to confessions for the obvious reason that secret
police interrogations produce coerced confessions.
The very circumstances of the secret police interrogation, quite without regard to testimony as to what transpired there, should preclude the
use of the word "voluntary" to describe its results. Menachem Begin, who
afterward became a member of the Israeli Parliament, speaking of his own
subjection to the Soviet technique which excluded the slightest physical
coercion, said:
Not a word of what you say will reach a single person in the
world outside. Only those, whose theory permits no doubting,
want the outside world to learn, will pierce the prison walls ....
Here there is no break in the wall of silence. Nobody will hear or
read .... 11
Speaking of persons subject to secret police interrogation Justice
Frankfurter, in Culombe v. Connecticut' said:
They are deprived of freedom without a proper judicial tribunal
having found them guilty, without a proper judicial tribunal
12. 378 U.S. 478, 496 (1963).
13. Quoted in ROGE, WHY MEN CONFESS 105.
14. 367 U.S. 568, 573 (1960).
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having found even that there is probable cause to believe that
they may be guilty. What actually happens to them behind the
closed door of the interrogation room is difficult if not impossible
to ascertain. Certainly, if through excess of zeal or aggressive
impatience or flaring up of temper in the face of obstinate silence a prisoner is abused, 'he is faced with the task of overcoming, by his lone testimony, solemn official denials. The
prisoner knows this-knows that no friendly or disinterested
witness is present-and the knowledge may itself induce fear.
But, in any case, the risk is great that the police will accomplish
behind their closed door precisely what the demands of our legal
order forbid: make a suspect the unwilling collaborator in establishing his guilt. This they may accomplish not only with
ropes and a rubber hose, not only by relay questioning persistently, insistently subjugating a tired mind, but by subtler
devices.
In the police station a prisoner is surrounded by known
hostile forces. He is disoriented from the world he knows and
in which he finds support. He is subject to coercing impingements, undermining even if not obvious pressures of every
variety. In such an atmosphere, questioning that is long continued-even if it is only repeated at intervals, never protracted
to the point of physical exhaustion-inevitably suggests
that the questioner has a right to, and expects, an answer. This is
so, certainly, when the prisoner has never been told that he need
not answer and when, because his commitment 'to custody seems
to be -at the will of his questioners, he has every reason to believe that he will be held and interrogated until he speaks.
Ordinarily the law presumes that men act to promote their interests,
not to damage them, and that among their interests men value most highly
their liberty and their lives. When the issue is the voluntariness of a confession the presumptions are reversed. In this context the most likely thing
to expect of a man is supposed to be his voluntary cooperation in his own
destruction.
Considered only from the point of view of trustworthiness as evidence, coercion per se does not render a confession so unreliable that it
should not be considered at all. The question is whether the coercion is
so severe that an innocent person is apt to confess; that is, whether the
immediate fear of not confessing overcomes the fear of the confession at
the trial. It is commonplace in state appellate court opinions affirming the
admission of a confession to demonstrate the guilt of the confessor, to
indicate that admissibility of a confession is thought of solely in terms of
reliability as evidence. 5 Quite aside from reliability as evidence, a confession must be excluded if coerced to any degree. Even a small degree of
coercion is a denial of due process because there is the constitutional privi15. See 3 WiGmoou, Evm.cz

. 822 (3d ed. 1940).
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lege against self-incrimination. 6 These separate and independent grounds
for exclusion are not mutually exclusive. The fact that a court thinks that
coercion was not sufficient to render the confession wholly untrustworthy
does not mean that the danger is not inherent in all forms of coercion to
induce the innocent to confess.The danger is simply greater in some forms
of coercion than it is in others. Entering into the Fifth Amendment privilege is the desirability of eschewing coercion to any degree and the consequent danger of unfettered official action which becomes the police state.
At any rate the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is not a
mere rule of evidence; it is a statement of public policy as clear as words
can be written, placed in the very foundation of our legal structure.
What has already been said about the obstacles to state court compliance with Supreme Court due process cases dealing with the denial of
counsel, applies with special force to due process decisions dealing with
confessions claimed to be coerced. To the considerations already mentioned must be added a considerable degree of state court aversion to the
privilege against self-incrimination, except when confessions are induced
by brutality or by putting the accused in abject fear of mob violence. It
seems reasonable to believe that cases of this kind, Brown v. Mississippi, 17 Chambers v. Florida,' and Moore v. Dempsey'9 are followed.
One should notice that in such cases the confessions should have been
rejected solely on the ground that the degree of coercion was quite enough
to wring confessions from innocent defendants and without regard to the
privilege against self-incrimination. It is in cases where coercion was not
of that degree, cases such as Culombe v. Connecticut20 and Haynes v.
Washington" in which the confessions were not rejected because the
means of procurement were shocking but because any coercion is a denial
of due process, that it is difficult to perceive an authoritative quality. For
reasons which should be obvious, state appellate court opinions on the
admissibility of confessions are not as revealing of the facts as those dealing with the denial of counsel. Nevertheless a good deal can be learned on
the point now under discussion. The twenty-five last volumes of the
Southern Reporter were examined for cases in which error was claimed
for admitting a coerced confession at the trial. There were twenty such
cases. Eighteen were affirmances. In one reversal the evidence of coercion
was corroborated by the doctors who administered drugs to the wounded
defendant.2 2 In the other reversal's an officer testified with refreshing
frankness, possibly in the expectation that his frankness would not
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

E.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1960).
297 U.S. 278 (1935).
309 U.S. 227 (1939).
261 U.S. 86 (1922).
367 U.S. 568 (1960).
373 U.S. 503 (1962).
Reddish v. State, 167 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1964).
Robinson v. State, 157 So.2d 49 (Miss. 1963).
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jeopardize a conviction, as indeed it did not in the trial court. In a recent
Florida case,2 4 in which the admission of a confession was affirmed, the
police conduct which induced the confession seems vastly more coercive
than in cases of the Culombe and Haynes variety. No United States
Supreme Court case on voluntariness of confession was discussed or cited.
As abstract theory we may say, if we wish, that neither the trial judge
or appellate judge in considering the issue of coercion, is affected by a belief in the truthfulness of the confession, which is immaterial on the constitutional question. One can theorize the same thing about a jury. On the
same day that Escobedo was decided, the Court decided Jackson v.
Denno 5 The conviction was reversed because New York law does not
require the judge to make a determination of voluntariness before allowing
the jury to consider it as evidence. The Court, speaking through Justice
White, held that quite irrespective of a belief in the truthfulness of the
confession the defendant was entitled 'to "a reliable determination on the
issue of voluntariness." '26 He observed that the jury's belief in the truth of
the confession "generates natural and potent pressures to find it voluntary
otherwise the guilty defendant goes free." What judge so compartmentalizes his mind that when passing on voluntariness, he is totally uninfluenced
by an aversion to letting a guilty defendant go free? The whole tenor of
the Escobedo dissents shows a strong aversion to letting defendants go
free. No judge likes to see the guilty go free. Elective judges, and especially trial judges, should reasonably be expected to consider community
attitudes. As a matter of fact, the same thing, but perhaps to a less marked
degree, can be said of appointed judges. Some former prosecutors on the
federal bench seem more motivated by the desirability of convictions than
by an aversion to self-incrimination. Imagine the position of the trial judge
who should reject a confession on the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant contradicted by the police, when the judge, as perhaps does the
community, believes the confession to be true. The pressure on the trial
judge both internal and external is tremendous.
Quite aside from the philosophy of a particular judge and his willingness to adhere to it regardless of political consequences or his own sociological predelictions, he is in a wretched position to afford the reliable
determination of which Justice White spoke in Jackson. He is asked to
decide the voluntariness of a confession obtained in secrecy. Generally,
only the defendant and the police are in a position to testify. Quite aside
from the pressure to find admissible a confession believed to be true, is the
the matter of credibility. Is the judge to believe the unsupported statement
of a man believed to have committed murder in preference to the testimony of officers, even though the latter have admittedly violated a few
laws in obtaining the confession, such as failing to take the accused
24. Milton v. Cochran, 147 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1962).
25. 378 U.S. 368 (1963).
26. 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1963).
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promptly before a committing magistrate? Escobedo testified that he was
promised immunity if he would involve his confederate. He was not believed. If he had been promised immunity as claimed this was quite immaterial. He had small chance of being believed in the face of police denial.
Under the circumstances who would believe Escobedo? Another example
like Escobedo is State v. Hughes: 7 "The accused contends that he was
beaten by these officers, but his testimony is unsupported." How could it
be supported?
The secret police interrogation is designed to coerce the accused and
to disable him from proving the coercion after it occurs. The trial judge
is actually in the dark. Of course he deals daily with the problem of deciding facts about which his only source of knowledge is the testimony of
witnesses. But he does not deal ordinarily with darkness by design, which
he is called on to do when deciding what transpired at a proceeding arranged purposely to keep the judge from knowing. If the police think that
the mere presence of counsel at their inquisitorial proceedings queers their
opportunity to receive voluntary confessions, but they really have nothing
to hide, why do they not record their proceedings on sound film? This
would be at least some indication of good faith in their claims.
If under circumstances comparable to a secret police interrogation the
trial judge were considering the voluntariness of any other kind of document except a confession, he would care little what the participants said.
He would simply hold that the proceedings were utterly incompatible with
the hypothesis of voluntariness and that the circumstances provided conclusive proof of coercion. Suppose that a hospital committee of leading
citizens having difficulty in raising funds abducts a rich bad man to a
remote and secret place where he is kept incommunicado until he makes
a gift of -all his money, which he has with him, to the committee. In a proceeding to regain his money can one imagine the judge saying "The bad
man's testimony that he was coerced is unsupported for the good citizens
deny this. They say that the bad man was quite willing to part with all he
owned. I attach no significance whatever to the abduction for all that
really matters is that the hospital get the money. How they get it is of no
concern to me so long as I can utter the words 'freely and voluntarily.'
These I now -utter because the testimony of coercion is unsupported. Unless I do say these words, this wretched man will get his money back and
consider also the crippling effect on fund raising if I should hold that to
abduct a man unlawfully and hold him incommunicado vitiates the gift"?
A great deal has been written both on and off the bench about balancing the social interest between the freedom of the individual and the
security of the state in the matter of admitting confessions. 28 What this
27. 154 So.2d 395 (La. 1963).
28. Clark, J. in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1957) ; Frankfurter, J. in Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1960); Jackson, J. in Wattsv. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1948);
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actually means is that coerced confessions are desirable, if not indispensable, as a means of law enforcement, so the problem is to determine the
quantity and quality of permissible coercion. Were it not for the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination this would be a permissible way to consider the admissibility of confessions. If without this specific privilege, the question were examined to see whether due process has
been afforded, it would be necessary to consider, in the light of history,
experience and the sensibilities of the time, just what means of coercion
could be stomached. Confessions procured by the whip might be rejected
while confessions procured by exhaustive interrogation might not. So far
as the states are concerned they could do this if they wished had the Fourteenth Amendment never have been adopted. Even so, they could so long
as the Fourteenth Amendment was not held to make the privilege obligatory upon the states as in Twining v. New Jersey29 but that, happily, is
no longer true. 0 The privilege is not merely an historical fact to be considered with all others in determining whether the means of obtaining a
confession is a denial of due process; the privilege is as meaningful in a
state proceeding as it is in a federal one. The Fifth Amendment privilege
made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment has no
qualifications. The application of the privilege is not dependent on whether
the collective security will not be impaired by allowing it. There is a balancing of the interests of the individual and the interest in security but
this balancing is not one to be made by the courts ad hoc. The balancing
was done when the Amendment was adopted. In this balancing it was
determined that no degree of coercion is admissible. Nevertheless, the
coerced confession is the rule, not the exception. The very circumstances
of obtaining a confession by the process of a secret police interrogation
is necessarily and universally coercive. The custom, however, has been to
admit the confession as voluntary if the police deny doing the specific
things the accused testifies they did, although the court has no way of
knowing what the police did. Appellate courts cannot disagree with the
trial court's determination of voluntariness, except to the extent of the
controverted part of the evidence, unless the trial judge has made a semantic slip and has articulated the wrong standard for determining voluntariness."'
Sometimes the police, when not talking about a particular confession
offered in evidence, are quite frank in telling the outside world about their
techniques for obtaining "confessions." Why shouldn't they? They hardly
are giving away any security secrets to the enemy. Surely the police credit
the non-police with a bit of common sense, enough to know that confessions behind closed doors are not the result of cocktail parties. Surely
Harlan, J. in Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1957); DEVLM, THE CRi:hINAL PROSECUTION
3x ENLArND 58 (1958).

29. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
30. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
31. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1960).
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they must credit the rest of us with knowing for what purpose the accused
are denied an opportunity to learn their constitutional rights, denied the
application of express statutes commanding officers arresting without
warrants to take the accused promptly before a committing magistrate,
whose duty it is to inform the accused that he cannot be compelled to
incriminate himself and that he has a right to counsel. On the other hand,
perhaps the police also have good reason to believe that many judges suffer
from some sort of legal schizophrenia on the subject of confessions.
Judges must be in a position to say that the confession is voluntary in
order to square with the Constitution. But they would probably be able
to say that about few confessions if the full facts were reliably known.
The way to eat the cake and have it too is to call a confession voluntary
because the police have arranged things so the courts rarely have reliable
means of knowledge. The Constitution gets its lip service; the police get
their confessions; and the judges get their hypocrisy.
Escobedo points the way out of this deplorable situation. It is deplorable even if the assertion that confessions are indispensable were a proven
sociological fact, which it certainly is not. Justice White thinks that the
secret police interrogation is such a finely tuned device that the presence
of counsel makes all interrogation futile. This seems to assume that there
are no voluntary confessions whatever. There must be some. Nevertheless,
it seems reasonable to believe that the presence of counsel will eliminate
from consideration the great bulk of coerced confessions so that courts
will be relieved of their present unfortunate plight. In those instances in
which, despite Justice White's prediction, the police do interrogate in the
presence of counsel and the accused do confess, the courts will vastly
improve their present opportunity for knowledge. Someone besides the
accused and the police will be able to testify.
The literal scope of application of Escobedo is to the accused who
have counsel and demand to consult him. It is hard to see how the Escobedo right to counsel can be denied the accused who has the means but
not the opportunity to employ counsel or who lacks both. Such a limitation of the principle could not be squared with Gideon. There is good
reason to believe that the objective rule of Escobedo will receive the same
kind of state court acceptance that Gideon has received, although the
opposition will be greater because the effect on police practices will be
greater. As already noted, due process cases have a dubious sort of
authority, but cases dealing with objective and definite facts have great
authority whether applauded or deplored. There can't be much of a
dispute over whether a defendant had counsel at his trial. It would be
hard to have a dispute over whether a confession was obtained in the
absence of counsel. Here is something any judge can get his teeth into. He
is not in the dark. He is not in the position, as he usually is at present, of
weighing the testimony of the accused against the testimony of the police,
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and all in the context of a perverted sense of "voluntariness." It is far
easier to rule that a defendant must have counsel than to rule that the
confession of a man believed guilty is involuntary. To follow a decision
that an accused is entitled to counsel at a time when the state is seeking
convicting evidence from the accused puts no strain on the trial judge.
He is accustomed to thinking in these terms. That the object of counsel
is to obtain acquittal is not a new idea. That a defendant even in a civil
proceeding is entitled to counsel at the discovery stage is a quite familiar
doctrine. Escobedo simply puts the criminal defendant on a par with the
civil defendant.
The definite standard of the right to counsel is vastly preferrable to
the alternative of denying or curtailing the right and then coping with the
results of such a denial on an ad hoc basis by the vague standards of due
process. We are committed to the adversary system. The Sixth Amendment pre-supposes it. None gainsays its shortcomings. Settling judicial
problems by contest does not always produce a perfect result, whether
the problems are civil or criminal. At least it is in keeping with both the
spirit and the letter of our basic concepts of justice, as the inquisitorial
system is not. The latter may be more efficient in a narrow sense just as
is any aspect of authoritarianism. The secret police interrogation is an
anachronism. In effect it is an ex parte secret determination of innocence
or guilt. It is difficult to distinguish it from the Soviet practice. 2
That high police officials consider such interrogation procedures judicial in purpose is indicated by a statement of Police Commissioner
Murphy at a conference in New York City on January 31, 1964, sponsored by the District Attorneys' Association of the State of New York."
Among a good many other things the Commissioner said, "It may well be
that, as Professor Inbau indicated, there is going to come a time when we
will not be allowed to question anybody. If that day arrives, it is going to
result in more innocent people being charged with crime than ever before."
Obviously the Commissioner used the word "innocent" not in the sense of
court determined, but of police determined innocence. The necessary implication is that a considerable number of people whom the police have
no valid reason to charge are nevertheless being charged with crime even
before "that time arrives." After "that time" more innocent people than
before will be charged. Apparently, the reason for this is that the police
will be unable to acquit the innocent, therefore, they must be charged.
The innocent must try to clear themselves before the courts.
The subject of the conference referred to was euphemistically called
"The interrogation of the accused; its needs and practices." Among the
practices discussed were the techniques of obtaining confessions by the
use of drugs, by hypnosis, by trickery and by "psychological techniques."
32. FEnmR, JUSTiCE ur Moscow

86 (1964).

33. Reported in 49 CoRNELL L.Q. 382 (1964).
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The report of the conference makes interesting reading for those interested
in the science of obtaining confessions. It is not surprising to learn that
just anybody cannot record the "free and voluntary" confession. Among
the interesting details is the account of one officer who had "tremendous
success" with a fake lie detector machine in which he caused colored lights
to flash on and off at will. Of this Professor Inbau commented: "I know of
that being used too, particularly in a city down South, where the police
were dealing with the little less educated type of person as a suspect."
How much nicer this sounds than to say that trickery, as with all forms of
coercion, is more efficacious with the ignorant than with the educated,
with the first offenders rather than the professional criminals. Commissioner McClellan84 of Canada probably revealed nothing new when he
observed that the professional criminals rarely confess because they know
their rights. The magnitude of educating police in the techniques of obtaining confessions is not generally appreciated. Commissioner Murphy 5
said that "with the rapidly changing techniques and the rapidly changing
legal situation, the police have a tremendous burden of education.... Indeed, in many respects we have to reeducate twenty-five thousand men every time a new interpretation or new decision is handed down from the
Bench." One perceives that the business of obtaining confessions is not at
all as simple as it sounds when one reads transcripts of trials at which
confessions are offered in evidence. It there sounds as if there were really
nothing to the process at all, the man simply wanted to confess and the
police wrote it down. But we see that in reality it isn't like that at all. In
one respect this enormous burden of training New York policemen to
receive the free and voluntary confessions should be relatively light-education in the content of Section 165 of the New York Criminal Code of
Criminal Procedure which provides that "the defendant must in all cases
be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and he may
give bond at any hour of the day or night," or in the content of Section 188
that "the magistrate must immediately inform him of the charge against
him,-and of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings,
and before any further proceedings are had." But the burden of training
policemen in evading the law and the Constitution must be great.
There is no doubt that the opposition to Escobedo is formidable, as
it is to any decision which renders more than lip service to fundamental
constitutional rights of criminal defendants. While there are other reasons besides giving advice, for according the right to counsel at the police
stage when self-incrimination is sought, it is quite clear that the opposition to the Escobedo rule is that coerced confessions become virtually
impossible to get into evidence. It is the more formidable because expressed in general terms such as Professor Inbau's remark about the
"civil liberties binge" the courts are on, and the extent to which this may
34. See note 33 supra.
35. See note. 33 supra.
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go "unless there is public resistance to this trend.""8 It is not hard to
whip up public resistance, for the short range danger from crime is
always easier to perceive than the long range danger of authoritarianism.
One reads quite a bit about the latter but nearly always in the context
of preserving an economic or social status quo, but these critics rarely
point to the dangers to personal liberty in the context of police practices.
Few can identify their own interests with those of a man charged with
crime, especially if he is believed guilty. Most of what appears in print
is the danger to the collective interest, the danger to the law-abiding
from the law-violating. The alleged dangers from criminals if police
practices are required to obey the Constitution obscures the danger of
becoming a police state.
It is not the purpose of this article to argue that the social utility
of applying, as literally as is possible, the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, is greater than the social utility of circumventing the
privilege. Nevertheless a few contentions offered as self-evident truths
should be noticed. One is that confessions are indispensable to effective
law enforcement. Professor Inbau, who styles himself as "police prosecution oriented," at the New York conference already referred to, said
that he would like to see some police department try the experiment of
"[following] the rules just as the courts have laid them down. In other
words the police are not going to vary those rules, they are not going to
cheat one bit." Since this project is advanced as a revolutionary idea,
it is fair to assume that it has never been tried. The Professor predicts
with confidence that chaos would result, but this is hardly proven
sociological datum. To the contrary, there is some experience with police
work under severe limitations in the use of coerced confessions and other
forms of illegally obtained evidence. Federal officers do their work under
the McNabb-Mallory rule. 7 The Sixth Amendment has always been applicable in federal courts. It is probably true, but difficult to demonstrate,
that trial federal courts feel more bound than do state courts to follow
the Supreme Court due process cases on the admissibility of confessions
and of evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures. Nevertheless
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal police agencies
are quite effective. It seems within the range of possibility that state
and municipal police could do as well. Another consideration worthy of
attention is that the greatest criminal danger is from the professionals
from whom few confessions are presently being obtained. The confession
technique is principally efficacious against first offenders and the ignorant
or stupid. Successes in obtaining self-incrimination against such defendants provide statistics of convictions which tend to obscure the
results in detecting the crime of professionals.
36. See note 33 supra.
37. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942); Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1956).
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If the experiment is tried of giving full accord to Constitutional
provisions, these may be found too restrictive to afford collective
security. If that be proved true in the future, then the risks of coerced
confessions must be assumed. Better that than the hypocritical practice
of pretending to observe the privilege against self-incrimination and
pretending to adhere to the adversary system of criminal proceedings.
Even a rewritten Fifth Amendment would provide some sort of effective
judicial control over confessions. There is much to gain and nothing to
lose from Escobedo.
Escobedo may well be the last major conflict between the Fourteenth
Amendment fundamentalists and the relativists. The conflict in views
began with the Slaughter House cases,"8 the first dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment, which put a narrow construction on the Amendment.
Justice Swayne there said that the Amendment was intended to give the
same protection from oppression by the states that had previously been
afforded against the federal government. This view failed to prevail by
the margin of one. From time to time other justices took the same view
but this view never commanded the Court. It came again within one vote
of doing so in Adamson v. California9 when Justices Douglas, Murphy
and Rutledge joined in the dissenting opinion of Justice Black which
showed that the Court had never fully examined Congressional debate
on the Amendment, at which proponents and opponents argued that the
purpose of the Amendment was to put the same restrictions on the
states which previously existed as to the federal government, that is, that
the whole Bill of Rights was made applicable to the states.
The contrary view prevailed. It held that only such rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments were applicable to state action as
"are of such a nature that they are included in the concept of due process
of law." Some parts of the Bill of Rights "are not of the very essence
of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is not to violate a
'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ,4o
The ranking of rights as fundamental or not fundamental, under
this doctrine, was a function of the Supreme Court. In the case last
quoted from, a man had been acquitted of murder in a Connecticut
court. The judgment was reversed and on a new trial the defendant was
convicted and sentenced to death notwithstanding his plea of double
jeopardy. The United States Supreme Court held that double jeopardy
was not applicable to the states since it was not "fundamental." It seemed
relevant to the Court that such protection is not afforded in civil law
countries. Justice Black, in his Adamson dissent, called this formula the
use of natural law to determine the scope of due process. The Court in
38. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
39. 332 U.S. 46 (1946).
40. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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Twining had observed that if rights safeguarded against federal action
are safeguarded against state action, this is so "not because those rights
are enumerated in the first eight amendments, but because they are of
such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process
of law."
The dominant view was that to qualify as fundamental it was not
sufficient for a right to be included in the Bill of Rights, it must also
impress the Justices as being fundamental. Over the decades some of
these rights managed so to qualify several very lately. Nearly a century
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the wisdom of the
Justices agreed with the wisdom of those who drafted and adopted the
Bill of Rights that the right to counsel, the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the privilege against self-incrimination are
directly applicable against the states. It requires no clairvoyance to
predict that the rights affecting one charged with crime not yet applicable
to the states will be carried over against the states, and that finally the
wisdom of the Court by natural law concepts will be identical with the
wisdom of the authors of the Bill of Rights. The reasons of the latter
for believing that persons should not be subject to double jeopardy, that
they should have the right to be tried by a jury and to be charged by a
grand jury rather than by a single public official, have the same claim
to validity and fundamentalism as they had in 1791. Such protections
are in the Bill of Rights notwithstanding that civil law countries have
not felt the need for them. Flexibility in constitutional interpretation to
cope with the changing needs of our society has little to do with marking
limits beyond which government, state as well as federal, may not go in
trenching on the liberty of the individual. The danger of becoming a
police state by the regulation of economic interests is slight as compared
with this danger by government unrestrained in its ability to arrest, convict and punish.
In dissenting to upholding a conviction obtained by illegal wire
tapping, Justice Brandeis 4 spoke of the terrible consequences of permitting the government to commit a crime in order to punish a criminal.
It cannot aid in respect for law for a citizen's right to be fundamental in
a federal court and not fundamental in a state court.
In a semantical sense the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentalists
have not prevailed. It has not been held that the whole of the Bill of
Rights was carried over by the Fourteenth Amendment, lock, stock and
barrel. But those provisions which have been carried over, have been
carried over intact, not as watered down versions. Gideon does not speak
in natural law terms but in Sixth Amendment terms. Since Escobedo was
the case which trenches on established police practice more than it seems
possible for any case in the future to do, it seems reasonable to believe
that the Bill of Rights will eventually have universal application.
41. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927).

